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RE-EXAMINING THE MEANING OF SUNZI’S 
BU ZHAN ER QU REN ZHI BING 不戰而屈人之兵 
AND ITS PRACTICALITY 
WU LEIJIA 吳磊佳 
This article re-examines the meaning of bu zhan er qu ren zhi bing 不戰而屈人之
兵, one of the core notions of Sunzi 孫子, and discusses its practicality. The article 
questions the popularly pacific and defensive view on this expression and refutes 
the argument that it is an idealistic concept. By analyzing the context and historical 
background of Sunzi, this article argues that bu zhan er qu ren zhi bing is a realis-
tic strategydeveloped to adapt to the increasingly fierce competition during the 
period of the Chunqiu 春秋 (770–481 B.C.E). The term can be applied to both of-
fensive and defensive strategies. Its meaning does not equate to but includes subju-
gating the enemy or frustrating his strategic goals through famou 伐謀 and fajiao 
伐交 rather than engaging in decisive battles. Through studying four historical 
cases from the Chunqiu, this article analyses how to apply famou and fajiao to 
achieve bu zhan er qu ren zhi bing in practice.  
KEYWORDS: Sunzi, bu zhan er qu ren zhi bing, famou, fajiao, warfare of Chunqiu  
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INTRODUCTION 
Sunzi 孫子, the most important classical Chinese military treatise, has a well-known 
saying: Bai zhan bai sheng, fei shan zhi shanzhe ye; bu zhan er qu ren zhi bing, 
shan zhi shanzhe ye 百戰百勝，非善之善者也；不戰而屈人之兵，善之善者也, 
which is usually translated as “To fight and win a hundred battles is not the most 
brilliant [method] among all brilliant [methods]; to subdue the enemy army without 
fighting is the most brilliant [method] among all brilliant [methods].”1 The above 
________________________ 
1 Sunzi, 1.28. For the various translations, see Shu Xun 1980, p. 88; Shi Meiheng 1987, p. 10; 
Ames 1993, p. 79; Sawyer 1996, p. 50; and Lin Wusun 2007, p. 29. Most researchers translate the 
character ren 人 as “enemy.” However, Harro von Senger proposes a distinctive view that ren 
should be translated into “men” after interviewing Qi Wen戚文, a Chinese expert of Sunzi (Sen-
ger 2015, p. 97). I agree with Senger that ren in general is often translated as “people” or “men” 
rather than “enemy.” In Chinese, the character corresponding to “enemy” is di 敵. However, in 
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famous quote is generally regarded as one of the core notions in the strategic 
thought of Sunzi, “and by extension, in Chinese strategic culture thought as a whole” 
in both the Chinese and Western academia.2 Most Chinese and Western scholars 
believe that this expression represents a pacifist and/or defensive point of view on 
war. For instance, some scholars say that it contains peace-loving thoughts and/or 
humanitarian concerns.3 Zhang Heng argues that it stresses “the importance of win-
ning people by virtue rather than by force.”4 Liu Tiewa opines that it means “rulers 
should arrive at their objectives without using force.”5 Victor H. Mair thinks that it 
describes a defensive strategy.6 Nadine Godehardt indicates that it means that pre-
ventive and defensive measures should be undertaken before the enemy’s first strike 
to avoid actual combat.7 And some other scholars believe that it is an idea of deter-
rence strategy.8 Their opinions sound reasonable and are in accordance with the 
“dominant view” about traditional Chinese strategic culture – China has “historical-
ly preferred to use force in defensive and limited roles.”9 However, does the pacific 
and defensive view on bu zhan er qu ren zhi bing really reflect the original meaning 
of Sunzi? If not, what does it exactly mean? These are the first set of questions to be 
discussed in this article. 
Although some scholars highly praise the value of bu zhan er qu ren zhi bing and 
regard it as the “highest state” of the Chinese classical strategic philosophy,10 many 
others question its practicality. For example, Guo Huaruo claims that it is an “unre-
alistic notion” (buqie shiji de xiangfa 不切實際的想法).11 Alastair Iain Johnston 
argues that it is just an “idealistic concept” (lixianghua de gainian 理想化的概念) 
___________________ 
Sunzi, ren often refers to “enemy-” For instance, Sunzi says: “Therefore, the one who is skilled in 
warfare subdues the army of ren without zhan 戰; takes the city of ren without attacking it; de-
stroys the state of ren without prolonged [operations]” (故善用兵者，屈人之兵而非戰也，拔人
之城而非攻也，毀人之國而非久也, Sunzi, 1. 32–33). All translations from Sunzi and other 
works are my own unless otherwise stated. It is obvious that ren refers to the “enemy.” Moreover, 
Sunzi says: “Therefore if [we can] make ren to show his [disposition of forces] while concealing 
our own, then we can concentrate [our forces] while [making] the enemy to disperse his” (故形人
而我無形，則我專而敵分, Sunzi, 2. 74). It can be seen that in Sunzi, the character ren and di are 
interchangeable. Hence, I think the character ren should be translated as “enemy” rather than 
“people” or “men” in bu zhan er qu ren zhi bing.  
2 Johnston 1998, p. 99. 
3 Sawyer 1996, p. 53, Wang Lianbin 1999, p. 154, Zhou Minyuan 2005, p. 128, and Wu Ru-
song 2016, p. 116.  
4 Zhang Heng 2013, pp. 10. 
5 Liu Tiewa 2014, pp. 559–560. 
6 Mair 2007, p. 142. 
7 Godehardt 2008, p. 22. 
8 Yu Rubo 1994, p. 18, Hu Xiaotie 1994, pp. 68–69, and Xie Guoliang 1995, p. 88. 
9 Mott – Kim 2006, pp. 2–3. The pacific and defensive view on traditional Chinese strategic 
culture is widely accepted by both Western and Chinese scholars. For example, John K. Fairbank 
asserts that the Chinese culture has a “pacifist bias” and regards violence as the “last resort” 
(Fairbank 1974, pp. 7–9). Jonathan R. Adelmann and Chih-yu Shih says that from a Chinese 
perspective, “war was seen as an aberration,” and China “showed a general preference for defen-
sive warfare” (Adelmann – Shih 1993, pp. 31–33). Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis be-
lieve that the Chinese state “generally followed a pragmatic and limited approach” to the use of 
force (Swaine – Tellis 2000, p. 65). Zhang Tiejun thinks that “the Han Chinese regimes normally 
preferred diplomatic measures to military solutions” (Zhang Tiejun 2002, pp. 77). 
10 See Xu – Zhang 2007, p. 47. 
11 Guo Huaruo 1984, p. 20. 
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without actual effect.12 Mair strongly criticizes it by saying that it is “an idealistic 
desideratum,” which is “simplistic and impractical, as well as potentially fatal.”13 
Some other scholars are not as straightforward as Guo, Johnston, and Mair, but they 
also seem to gently indicate that it may be too idealistic to be realized in practice.14 
Is bu zhan er qu ren zhi bing just an idealistic concept as argued and indicated by 
the above scholars? If not, how can it be applied in practice? These are the second 
set of questions to be studied in this article. I think that a key to answer the above 
two sets of questions is to understand the military term zhan 戰, which should mean 
“do open battles” rather than “fight.” The character qu 屈 in the above famous 
quote from Sunzi is usually translated into “subdue.”15 The original meaning of qu 
is “bend” and extends its meaning to “make [one] bend/subdue.” But it also can 
refer to “bend one’s goals.” As I will explain in detail later, a more appropriate 
translation of the quote should be “To fight and win a hundred open battles is not 
the most brilliant [method] among all brilliant [methods]; to subdue the enemy ar-
my or frustrate its strategic goals without doing open battles is the most brilliant 
[method] among all brilliant [methods].” 
CHINESE UNDERSTANDING OF DEFENSE AND OFFENSE IN THE CHUNQIU 
Huang Pumin argues that the thought of Sunzi is affected by the history of the 
Chunqiu 春秋 period (770–5th c. B.C.E.),16 a well-known era of war. Huang’s 
opinion is persuasive. The philosophic thinking, value, and culture of a country or 
nation cannot arise purely from the mind. They must be related to the history of that 
country or nation. In order to understand Sunzi, it is necessary to firstly understand 
the Chinese concepts of defense and offense during the Chunqiu period. First of all, 
I will briefly introduce the political situation of the Chunqiu. In the 11th year of 
King You of Zhou (Zhou You wang 周幽王, 771 B.C.E.),17 the allied forces of the 
________________________ 
12 Johnston 1991, p. 37. 
13 Mair 2007, p. 142. 
14 For instance, Wang Lianbin thought it represents the “perfectly ideal state” (wanmei de lix-
iang jingjie 完美的理想境界, Wang Lianbin 1999, p. 154). Li Jijun names it the “most perfect 
state” (zui wanmei de jingjie 最完美的境界, Li Jijun 1999, pp. 146). Li Ling opines that it is an 
“ideal state” (lixiang tai 理想態, Li Ling 2006, p. 120). Lü Xichen and Cao Jing call it the “high-
est ideal state” (zuigao lixiang jingjie 最高理想境界, Lü – Cao  2010, p. 97). 
15 See Shu Xun 1980, p. 88, Shi Meiheng 1987, p. 10, Ames 1993, p. 79 Sawyer 1996, p. 50, 
Lin Wusun 2007, p. 29, and Mair 2007, p. 50.  
16 Huang Pumin 1995, pp. 95–99. 
17 Under the Zhou feudal system, the noble/ruling class included four sub-classes: wang 王, 
gong 公, dafu 大夫, and shi 士. In principle, only tianzi 天子, the master of tianxia 天下 (the 
ancient Chinese circle of civilization) could title himself wang. Although in name, Zhou Tianzi 
owned the whole tianxia as said in Shijing 詩經 (“All [land] under the sky are the wang’s lands. 
[All people] from the land and shores are the wang’s subjects” 溥天之下，莫非王土，率土之濱，
莫非王臣, Mao shi zhengyi 13.931), practically, Zhou tianzi only directly controlled a small part 
of it, which is called wangji 王畿. And there were hundreds of “feudal states” (guo 國) ruled by 
zhuhou 諸侯 (“monarchs of feudal states”) who served Zhou tianzi. The zhuhou had five ranks 
(from high to low): gong 公, hou 侯, bo 伯, zi 子, and nan 男. Gong was also used as a general 
form of address of all five ranks of zhuhou. Inside a feudal state, there existed many fiefs called 
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state of Shen 申, the state of Zeng 繒, and Quanrong 犬戎18 attacked King You of 
Zhou and killed him because he deposed Taizi Yijiu 太子宜臼.19 Since then, Zhou 
gradually lost its authority and control over tianxia. The Zhou feudal states no long-
er obeyed Zhou and started to attack and annex each other. In the early Chunqiu, 
there were no particularly powerful states. In the middle Chunqiu, four great powers, 
Qi 齊 in the east, Chu 楚 in the south, Jin 晉 in the north, and Qin 秦 in the north-
west, arose and in the late Chunqiu, two more great powers, Wu 吳 and Yue 越 
arose in the southeast. Apart from them, there were a number of medium powers, 
like Song 宋, Lu 魯, Wei 衛, and Zheng 鄭, plus many small states. Figure 1 shows 
the major states of the Chunqiu: 
 
Figure 1. Major States of the Chunqiu period. Map drawn by the author.    
In general, the attitude of the Chunqiu Chinese states towards defense and offense 
was realistic. They followed a principle summarized in Sunzi: “[One] defends when 
[one’s strength] is insufficient. [One] attacks when [one’s strength] is more than 
enough” (shou ze buzu, gong ze youyu 守則不足，攻則有餘).20 In the Chunqiu, on 
one hand, great powers were aggressive when facing weaker states. They frequently 
attacked weaker states to expand their territories and influence. For example, during 
___________________ 
jia 家 ruled by dafu, who served zhuhou. Dafu was also a general form of address and it included 
two sub-ranks (from high to low): qinq 卿 and dafu.  
18 Quanrong refers to the barbarians living to the west of Zhou.  
19 Shiji (hereafter SJ), 4.149. Among all the sons of a monarch, the one officially acknowl-
edged as the heir was called Taizi. Shen hou 申侯 was the maternal grandfather of Taizi Yijiu. He 
attacked King You of Zhou to help his grandson to seize back the power. 
20 Sunzi 1.45. 
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the Chunqiu, Qi annexed 10 states; Jin annexed over 20 states; Chu annexed 45 
states.21 Qin annexed 20 states in the reign of Lord Mu of Qin (Qin Mu gong 秦穆
公, r. 659–621 B.C.E.).22 But on the other hand, they were cautious about fighting 
with opponents about their equal. In most cases, they exercised restraint and were 
willing to compromise rather than risking doing battles with another great power. 
For example, in the 21st year of King Hui of Zhou (Zhou Hui wang 周惠王, 656 
B.C.E.), Qi invaded Chu but finally, the two great powers reached a peace agree-
ment without having massive battles. Jin and Chu contended for hegemony for 
nearly a century. However, during that period, they only engaged in four massive 
battles: the battle of Chengpu 城濮 in the 20th year of King Xiang of Zhou (Zhou 
Xiang wang 周襄王, 632 B.C.E.), the battle of Bi 邲 in the 10th year of King Ding 
of Zhou (Zhou Ding wang 周定王, 597 B.C.E.), the battle of Yanling 鄢陵 in the 
11th year of King Jian of Zhou (Zhou Jian wang 周簡王, 575 B.C.E.), and the bat-
tle of Zhanban 湛阪 in the 15th year of King Ling of Zhou (Zhou Ling wang 周靈
王, 557 B.C.E.). 
Most of the time, Jin and Chu contended for hegemony through striking the allies 
of their competitors but avoided directly fighting with each other. When they esti-
mated that their powers were more than enough, they adopted offensive strategies. 
When they estimated that their powers were not sufficient, usually they chose to 
back down. For instance, in the 25th year of King Xiang of Zhou (627 B.C.E.), the 
Jin army and the Chu army confronted each other across the river Zhi 泜. But nei-
ther side risked crossing the river to attack first. Finally, they withdrew respective-
ly.23 In the 28th year of King Xiang of Zhou (624 B.C.E.), Chu besieged the state of 
Jiang 江. The allied forces of Jin and Zhou attacked Chu to rescue Jiang. But they 
retreated without fighting after encountering the Chu army.24 In the 13th year of 
King Jian of Zhou (573 B.C.E.), Chu attacked Song. The Jin army went to rescue 
Song and encountered the Chu army in the valley of Mijiao 靡角. The Chu army 
retreated without fighting.25 In short, on one hand, the great powers were aggressive. 
They pursued hegemony and expansion through attacking and annexing weaker 
states. On the other hand, a great power usually would not rashly fight a massive 
battle with another one unless it was inevitable. But not all great powers act ration-
ally. The state of Qin once frequently fought with its stronger neighbor, Jin. But the 
continuous wars with Jin did not bring benefits to Qin. It was suppressed by Jin in 
the Northwest corner and was isolated from the heartland of ancient China (the 
middle and lower reaches of the Huanghe 黃河 river). Another exception was the 
state of Wu, who overestimated its power and made too many enemies. Finally, it 
exhausted its strength during continuous wars and was annexed by the state of Yue, 
which makes it the only fallen great power in the Chunqiu. The medium powers 
also in general took a realistic attitude towards offense and defense. Medium pow-
________________________ 
21 Fan Wenlan 2002, vol. 7, p. 33. 
22 SJ 87.2542. 
23 CZZZ 17.550. 
24 Du Yu 杜預 said that Chu withdrew its army besieging Jiang to meet the allied forces of Jin 
and Zhou. Hence the allied forces retreated without fighting because they had already achieved 
the goal of lifting the siege of Jiang (CZZZ 18.576).  
25 CZZZ 28.930–931. 
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ers between great powers, like the states of Song and Zheng, were the objects con-
tended by the great powers. They could not defend themselves independently and 
had to affiliate to a great power for protection. In return, they had to take orders 
from that great power. But this kind of relationship usually was not very stable. 
Medium powers changed sides along with the shift in the balance of forces between 
the great powers. For example, the state of Zheng frequently swung between Jin and 
Chu depending on which side had the upper hand. Medium powers did not always 
passively follow the great powers. When opportunities arose, they seized them to 
actively expand their territories. For instance, after defeating Chu at the battle of 
Chengpu, Jin became the hegemon of the heartland of China. Most states, including 
Lu, submitted to it. Their actions were restricted by Jin so that they could not wage 
a  war at will without the permission of Jin. In the winter of the 24th year of King 
Xiang of Zhou (626 B.C.E.), Lord Wen of Jin (Jin Wen gong 晉文公, r. 636–628 
B.C.E.) died and the Qin army crossed Jin’s territory to attack Zheng without noti-
fying Jin. Jin was enraged by Qin’s insolence. In the summer of the next year, Jin 
ambushed the returning Qin army at the narrow passage of the mountain of Xiao 殽. 
When Jin was focusing on preparing the funeral of Lord Wen of Jin and the war 
with Qin, Lu seized the chance to attack the state of Zhu 邾.26 In the autumn of the 
31st year of King Xiang of Zhou (621 B.C.E.), Lord Xiang of Jin (Jin Xiang gong 
晉襄公, r. 627–621 B.C.E.) died. The Jin noblemen divided because of a dispute on 
the succession problem. Again, Lu seized the opportunity to attack Zhu.27 In sum-
mary, the medium powers between the great powers were victims of the contention 
wars. Their first consideration was to survive the environment of fierce competition. 
They usually depended more on political and diplomatic methods rather than mili-
tary means to protect themselves from the threats of the great powers. But when the 
great powers’ control over them had weakened, they would seize chances to attack 
each other and small states for expansion. Exceptions were Wu and Yue, which 
were far away from the heartland of China, the focal point of wars of hegemony. 
Hence, they were much less affected by the wars of contention between the great 
powers and had broader space for development. Finally, both of them had devel-
oped into great powers and played key roles in the late Chunqiu.  
RE-EXAMINING THE MEANING OF BU ZHAN ER QU REN ZHI BING 
I disagree with the interpretation of bu zhan er qu ren zhi bing as peaceful and de-
fensive because this has two crucial problems. First of all, it is not in accordance 
with the historical background. Sunzi was written between the late Chunqiu and 
middle Zhanguo 戰國 (5th c. – 221 B.C.E).28 Logically, the thought and theories of 
Sunzi should have been affected by the war practices during the Chunqiu. Moreover, 
________________________ 
26 CZZZ 17.548. 
27 CZZZ 19.595. 
28 There are arguments on the authorship of Sunzi. The most popular view believes that Sun 
Wu 孫武 (around 6th-5th c. B.C.E.), a high-ranking commander of Wu, is the author. Another 
view argues that Sun Bin 孫臏 (around 4th c. B.C.E.), a high-ranking military advisor of Qi, is the 
author. And there are other opinions on the authorship. 
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Sunzi mentions former brilliant warriors a few times,29 which also implies that it 
was written based on studying the experiences from past wars.  
In the Chunqiu, hundreds of states frequently fought with each other.30 As I have 
discussed in the last section, those great powers were especially aggressive. They 
annexed lots of small states. A Jin nobleman, Ru Qi女齊 once said frankly:  
[The royal houses of] Yu 虞, Guo 虢, Jiao 焦, Hua 滑, Huo 霍, Yang 揚, Han 韓, 
and Wei 魏 share the same ancestral name Ji 姬 [with the royal house of Jin].31 Jin 
became great because of [annexing them]. If [Jin] did not invade these small states, 
where would [Jin] get [land] from?32  
There were 148 states recorded in the historical literature but only a tiny fraction of 
them survived after nearly 300 years of wars.33 Hence, how could a military work 
advocating peace and defense originate in such a cruelly competitive era of wars? 
This is very unlikely. 
Secondly, the peaceful and defensive view on bu zhan er qu ren zhi bing is not in 
accordance with the context of Sunzi. If we study Sunzi carefully, we will find that 
it focuses more on offensive rather than defensive strategy. The first chapter of 
Sunzi, “Ji” 計 (Assessment, also known as “Shiji” 始計, Pre-war assessment) talks 
about whether a war should be launched based on pre-war assessments. It argues 
that one should only start a war on the premise that the victory can be guaranteed. 
Obviously, Sunzi mainly considers the warfare issue from the perspective of the 
attacking side, who decides when and where to start a war. For the defending side, 
the war is forced on it, which leaves it no choice. Its second chapter, “Zuozhan” 作
戰 (Making operational principles), points out the disadvantages of being involved 
in a long war. Mair opines that it “stands in sharp contrast to Mao Zedong’s advo-
cacy of long, drawn-out war.”34 However, I argue that Sunzi and Mao actually share 
the same point of view. They just look at the problem from different perspectives. 
Mao takes the perspective of the defenders, whose military power is usually weaker 
than the offensive side. For example, in the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War 
(1937–1945), China’s military strength was weaker than Japan’s but the country 
had the advantages of a vast territory and overwhelming population. Hence, China 
preferred a prolonged war to gradually exhaust the enemy’s strength and wait for 
the change of the international situation, like the outbreak of the Pacific war. On the 
contrary, Sunzi mainly takes the perspective of the attackers who want a quick vic-
tory. When arguing why a protracted war is inimical, “Zuozhan” of Sunzi mentions 
“transporting grains to [troops] 1,000 li 裡35 [away from the homeland]” (qianli 
________________________ 
29 Sunzi 1.43, 47, and 3.148. 
30 Xie Guoliang estimates that over 600 wars happened during the Chunqiu (Xie Guoliang 
1995, p. 84).  
31 Sharing the same ancestral name means they are the descendants of the same ancestor. It 
was immoral for them to annex each other.  
32 CZZZ 39.1257–1258: 虞、虢、焦、滑、霍、揚、韓、魏，皆姬姓也，晉是以大。若非
侵小，將何所取？  
33 Fan Wenlan 2002, vol. 7, p. 35. Xie Guoliang claims that there were over 160 states (Xie 
Guoliang 1995, p. 84).  
34 Mair 2007, p. 80. 
35 Li is a traditional Chinese length unit. One li is equivalent to approximately 400 meters in 
the Chunqiu. 
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kuiliang 千里饋糧),36 which clearly shows that it considers wars going on in the 
heartland of the enemy state. It also says that “[if] the army is stationed in the field 
for a long time, the wealth and resources of the state will be insufficient [to support 
it]” (jiu pushi ze guoyong buzu 久暴師則國用不足).37 In the Chunqiu, the defend-
ers usually stayed inside the walled cities. The army stationed in the field obviously 
refers to the attackers. The phrase bu zhan er qu ren zhi bing is in the third chapter 
of Sunzi, “Mougong” 謀攻 (Planning offensives), in which the disadvantages of 
directly storming fortified cities are discussed in detail.38 This again is seen from 
the perspective of the attacking side. Therefore, how could a military work mainly 
focusing on offensive strategy advocate a peaceful and defensive view? This is 
illogical. 
As I have mentioned before, a vital clue to the meaning of bu zhan er qu ren zhi 
bing is to understand the phrase bu zhan 不戰, which is usually interpreted as 
“without fighting,”39 or “without a battle.”40 Johnston offers another explanation: 
“before fighting.” Johnston says that if so, bu zhan er qu ren zhi bing then means 
“to weaken the enemy before fighting with it.” 41  However, this interpretation 
sounds farfetched because weakening the enemy army first and then fighting with it 
is still directly engaging with the enemy. I think that most researchers misunder-
stand the military term zhan 戰, which does not simply mean “fight” in ancient 
China. Sunzi says: “Therefore the principle of using forces is: if ten or five times the 
enemy strength, then it can besiege or attack his [stronghold] … if equal, then it can 
zhan with them.”42 It can be seen that the term zhan is different from wei 圍 (be-
siege) and gong 攻 (attack). It particularly refers to a battle fought under “equal” 
conditions. Sunzi also says: “Hence if we want to zhan, although the enemies have 
built high ramparts and deep entrenchments [to protect them], they have to [come 
out] to zhan with us …,”43 which indicates that zhan refers to fighting open battles 
in the field. Hence it is questionable to simply translate zhan into “fight.” Zuozhuan 
左傳 says: “Both [sides] completing their formations [and then starting to fight] is 
called zhan” (jie zhen yue zhan 皆陣曰戰).44 The character zhan was only used to 
describe a “fair” open battle in ancient China. According to the traditions of Zhou, 
the belligerents should fight at an appointed place and time and they need to “[wait 
for the opponent] to complete his formation before beating the drums” (cheng lie er 
gu 成列而鼓).45 Zuozhuan also says that “[ attacking and defeating the enemy army] 
before it has completed its formation is called defeating such and such an army” (di 
________________________ 
36 Sunzi 1.18. 
37 Sunzi 1.19. 
38 Sunzi 1.30–31. 
39 See Shu Xun 1980, p. 88, Shi Meiheng 1987, p. 10, Ames 1993, pp. 79, Sawyer 1996, p. 50, 
and Lin Wusun 2007, p. 29. 
40 Mair 2007, p. 50. 
41 Johnston 1992, p. 63. 
42 Sunzi 1.34–35: 故用兵之法，十則圍之，五則攻之…敵則能戰之. 
43 Sunzi 2.72: 故我欲戰，敵雖高壘深溝，不得不與我戰者... 
44 CZZZ 9.277. 
45 Sima fa jinzhu jinyi, 1.9. In ancient China, the army sent the signal of attacking by beating 
drums.  
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wei zhen yue bai moushi 敵未陳曰敗某師).46 An ambush or a raid could not be 
called zhan. For example, in the 25th year of King Xiang of Zhou (627 B.C.E.), 
Chunqiu says: “A small Jin army and Jiangrong 姜戎 defeated a large Qin army at 
Xiao 殽.”47 Because Jin and Jiangrong ambushed the Qin army, Chunqiu does not 
use the wording zhan. In my view, it should rather say: “A small Jin army and 
Jiangrong engaged in an open battle with a large Qin army at Xiao. The Qin army 
collapsed” (Jin ren ji Jiangrong yu Qin shi zhanyu Xiao, Qin shi baiji 晉人及姜戎
與秦師戰于殽，秦師敗績). Another example is the battle of Zuili 檇李. In the 
23rd year of King Jing of Zhou (Zhou Jing wang 周敬王, 497 B.C.E.), Chunqiu 
says that “Yuyue defeated Wu at Zuili” (Yuyue bai Wu yu Zuili 於越敗吳于檇
李).48 In this battle, both sides had already completed formations in advance. How-
ever, Yue used a trick to disrupt the formation of the Wu army before attacking it. 
Therefore, when the two armies started to fight, the Wu soldiers were not drawn up. 
In such a case, Chunqiu still does not use the wording zhan because it was not a 
“fair” open battle. Hence, I argue that bu zhan does not mean “without fighting” but 
means “to avoid fighting ‘fair’ open battles with the enemy army.” Sunzi makes this 
point very clear by saying that “do not intercept or attack [an army with] well orga-
nized flags and great formations.”49 Instead, it prefers to opt for “attacking when 
and where the enemy is not prepared and unaware [of the threat].”50 
In the Chunqiu, Zhou tianzi lost authority and tianxia was in great disorder. Wars 
became more frequent and cruel at that time. Fighting nobly and fairly no longer 
suited the new situation. For example, at the battle of Hong 泓 between Chu and 
Song in the 14th year of King Xiang of Zhou (638 B.C.E.), Lord Xiang of Song 
(Song Xiang gong 宋襄公, r. 650–637 B.E.C.) refused to attack until the Chu army 
completed its formation.51 Such a noble decision caused a crushing defeat of Song. 
The change of situation bred the thoughts of Sunzi, including bu zhan er qu ren zhi 
bing. Unlike Confucianism that advocates restoring the old order, Sunzi emphasizes 
on studying how to adapt to the new era. The battles of Xiao and Zuili can both be 
regarded as examples of bu zhan er qu ren zhi bing. 
However, it is worthwhile to note that the concept of bu zhan is not completely 
identical with “not fighting” but does include this notion. Sunzi would rather opt for 
famou 伐謀 (to strike [the enemy] through stratagems) and fajiao 伐交 (to strike 
[the enemy] through diplomacy)  than fabing 伐兵 (directly engaging with the ene-
my army in the field) and gongcheng 攻城 (“attacking [strongly fortified] walled 
cities”).52 The reason is that famou and fajiao can “preserve interests without wear-
________________________ 
46 CZZZ 9.277. 
47 CZZZ 17.542: 晉人及姜戎敗秦師於殽. Jiangrong refers to the barbarians having the an-
cestral name Jiang, living in the southern borderlands of Jin. 
48 CZZZ, 56.1842. Yuyue is another name of the state of Yue 越. 
49 Sunzi 2.97: 無邀正正之旗，無擊堂堂之陣。   
50 Sunzi 1.15: 攻其無備，出其不意。  
51 The official title of the Song monarchs was Song gong 宋公. 
52 Sunzi 1.28–30. Famou is usually interpreted as attacking the enemy’s strategy (Ames 1993, 
p. 79, Johnston 1998, p. 94, and Lin Wusun 2007, p. 29) or plans (Sawyer 1996, p. 50 and Mair 
2007, p. 83). Fajiao is often translated as attacking the enemy’s alliances (Ames 1993, p. 79, 
Sawyer 1996, p. 50, Johnston 1998, p. 94, and Mair 2007, p. 83). However, such explanations 
have two problems. First of all, they confuse the line between famou, fajiao and fabing, gong-
10 WU LEIJIA 
ing down the forces.”53 In the Chunqiu, the inter-state relations were very compli-
cated. An ally today might become an enemy tomorrow. If a state consumed too 
much strength in a war, no matter if it finally won or not, it would become vulnera-
ble to other states, even including its allies. As warned by Sunzi, they might “take 
advantage of its exhaustion to launch actions [disadvantageous to it]” (cheng qi bi 
er qi 乘其弊而起).54 For instance, the state of Wu, a great power arising in the 
southeast during the late Chunqiu once defeated almost all its neighbors including 
two great powers, Chu and Qi. But continuous wars gradually exhausted Wu’s 
power. Eventually, Wu’s vassal state Yue took advantage of this and successfully 
annexed Wu. Merely relying on force could not make a state beat its competitors 
and even could not guarantee its survival in the Chunqiu. 
Guo Huaruo believes that the enemy will surrender without fighting only when 
the outcome of the war is a foregone conclusion. And even such a special case is 
still the result of fighting.55 However, Guo’s opinion is not very persuasive because 
he comes to the conclusion by simply studying the Chinese civil war (1927–1949), 
which is just a tiny fraction of the entire history of Chinese war. Johnston argues 
that practically the enemy cannot be defeated relying solely on nonviolent means, 
like famou and fajiao, which can only be used to weaken the enemy. He opines that 
the relationship of famou, fajiao, and fighting is not a sequence of preferences but a 
“temporal sequence.” Famou and fajiao are not necessarily better options than fa-
bing. They are just applied before fighting to weaken the enemy. Violent means are 
still the last step to eventually defeat the enemy.56 Johnston’s opinion is reasonable 
to a certain extent. Sometimes, famou, fajiao, and violent means need to be used 
together to achieve victory. For instance, at the battle of Zuili, Yue disrupted the 
formation of the Wu army through famou before attacking it. And I agree with 
Johnston that famou and fajiao are not always better options than fabing. Some 
researchers assert that Sunzi places more emphasis on stratagem than strength.57 
Such a point of view is groundless. Sunzi clearly points out that overwhelming 
strength is a decisive factor of victory by saying:  
A victorious army’s [ strength compared to its enemy’s] is like one yi 鎰 com-
pared to one zhu 銖.58 A defeated army’s [ strength compared to its enemy’s] is 
like one zhu compared to one yi.59 
Moreover, Sunzi does not absolutely oppose fabing and gongcheng. It says: “There-
fore, the general principle of using forces is: if ten or five times the enemy strength, 
___________________ 
cheng because attacking the enemy’s plans and alliances could involve fabing and gongcheng, for 
instance, attacking the army of the enemy’s ally. Secondly, they confuse the line between famou 
and fajiao. For example, thwarting the enemy’s plan by attacking his ally should be categorized 
into which strategy, famou or fajiao? Since Sunzi distinguishes famou from fajiao and prioritizes 
the former over the latter, they should be different.  
53 Sunzi 1.33: 兵不頓，而利可全。  
54 Sunzi 1.19. 
55 Guo Huaruo 1984, p. 99–100. 
56 Johnston 1992, p. 63–64. 
57 See Zhang – Yao 1996, p. 217–218; and Lo Ping-Cheung 2012, p. 122. 
58 Yi and zhu are ancient Chinese units of weight. One yi is equal to 480 or 576 zhu.  
59 Sunzi 1.51: 勝兵若以鎰稱銖，敗兵若以銖稱鎰。 
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then [your army] can besiege or attack [the enemy’s stronghold].”60 If one does 
have overwhelming military advantages over the enemy, famou and fajiao might be 
unnecessary and fabing and gongcheng may be the simplest and most efficient way 
to subdue or completely destroy the enemy. However, Johnston’s argument is based 
on that one’s goal is to defeat the enemy army, in which case certainly violent 
means are essential. But the ultimate goal behind all state actions is to obtain li 利 
(“interests and benefits”) and/or remove hai 害 (“[potential] harms and threats”). 
Defeating the enemy army is just one of the means to achieve such goals but not the 
goals themselves. If defeating the enemy cannot help to achieve these goals, then 
such a military victory is meaningless.  
Li Ling argues that fabing is used when famou and fajiao are impossible.61 How-
ever, as I have discussed above, if one’s military power is much stronger than his 
enemy, then fabing may be a better choice than famou and fajiao. On the other hand, 
Sunzi clearly says: “If [your strengths] are less and weaker [than the enemy’s], then 
[you] should run away and avoid [fighting with] him.”62 It is unwise to wage open 
battles with a much stronger enemy. For example, in the battle of Suqi 速杞
between Chu and Sui 隨 in the 16th year of King Huan of Zhou (Zhou Huan wang 
周桓王, 704 B.C.E.) and the battle of Hong between Chu and Song, Sui and Song 
fought against the overwhelming Chu forces in open battles, which caused their 
disastrous failures. It also may be unwise to engage in open battles with a well-
matched or slightly weaker enemy. For instance, in the battle of Hequ 河曲 between 
Jin and Qin in the 4th year of King Qin of Zhou (Zhou Qin wang 周頃王, 615 
B.C.E.) and the battle of Yanling 鄢陵, although Jin held the upper hand in both of 
the battles, it did not achieve any decisive results. Therefore, I argue Sunzi means 
that generally famou and fajiao are better means than fabing and gongcheng when 
one does not have absolute predominance over the enemy or is even weaker than 
the enemy. Sunzi does not explain how to actually apply these strategies. By apply-
ing famou and fajiao, can one completely avoid fighting with the enemy to achieve 
one’s goals? It is also noteworthy that between famou and fajiao, Sunzi prioritizes 
the former over the latter. What are the reasons for it? Purely theoretical analysis is 
too abstract. I will further elaborate the practical application of bu zhan er qu ren 
zhi bing and explain why Sunzi prioritizes famou over fajiao through studying four 
historical cases from the Chunqiu. 
CASE STUDIES: THE APPLICATION OF BU ZHAN ER QU REN ZHI BING DURING THE 
CHUNQIU 
The first case is the “alliance of Shaoling” (Shaoling zhi meng 召陵之盟). After 
Zhou tianzi lost control over tianxia, Qi started to expand under the name of zun 
wang rang yi 尊王攘夷 (“revering [Zhou] wang and expelling the barbarians”). In 
the 10th year of King Hui of Zhou (667 B.C.E.), Zhou tianzi officially granted Lord 
Huan of Qi (Qi Huang gong 齊桓公, 685–643 B.C.E.)63 the position of bo 伯.64 
________________________ 
60 Sunzi 1.34: 故用兵之法，十則圍之，五則攻之。 
61 Li Ling 2006, p. 120. 
62 Sunzi 1.36: 少則能逃之，不若則能避之。 
63 The official title of the Qi monarchs was Qi hou 齊侯. 
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Hence, Qi became the first hegemon during the Chunqiu. The only state daring to 
challenge Qi was Chu, which was expanding northward and repeatedly attacking 
Qi’s ally, Zheng. In response, Qi and its allies Song, Lu, Chen 陳, Wei, Zheng, Xu 
許, and Cao 曹, crushed Chu’s ally Cai 蔡 and then invaded Chu in the spring of the 
21st year of King Hui of Zhou (656 B.C.E.).65 Instead of immediately dispatching 
troops to meet the invaders, King Cheng of Chu (Chu Cheng wang 楚成王, r. 671–
626 B.C.E.) sent an envoy to test their intention first.66 The Chu envoy carried King 
Cheng’s message to Lord Huan: 
Your highness lives by the North Sea and I, a person who lacks virtue, lives by the 
South Sea.67 [The distance between our states is such far] so that even our cattle 
and horses in a period of heat can never cross the border to chase each other. [I 
did not expect Your highness to come to my land. What is the reason?68 
It can be seen that King Cheng obviously preferred to solve the conflict by diplo-
matic means rather than fighting with the powerful allies. Qi qing Guan Zhong 管
仲 replied to the Chu envoy on behalf of Lord Huan: 
You did not pay bundled waterweeds [used to filter the rice wine] as tribute, 
[which caused] the lack of [necessities] for the wang’s sacrifices, because the rice 
wine [used for sacrifices] cannot be filtered. Hence Ie come to investigate it. 
[Zhou] Zhao wang 昭王 did not return after his punitive expedition to the south.69 
Hence I come to investigate it.70 
The response of Guan Zhong was meaningful. He said that Lord Huan came to 
investigate two faults of Chu. The first was a minor one but with conclusive evi-
dence. The second was about murdering Zhou tianzi, the most serious crime at that 
time but with no strong evidence at all. Thus Qi kept its options open. The matter 
could be either minimized (only to levy the tribute from Chu) or maximized (to 
exterminate Chu) depending on the situation. Some scholars mention the concept of 
punitive expedition (zheng 征), which was regarded as a type of just war in tradi-
tional China. Its purpose is to “punish the abusive ruler and rescue the suffering 
___________________ 
64 SJ 4.151. Here, bo does not refer to the third rank of zhuhou but means houbo 侯伯, the 
leader of zhuhou, who had the power to command zhuhou on behalf of tianzi. 
65 CZZZ 12.374. 
66 The monarchs of Chu refused to acknowledge the position and authority of Zhou Tianzi. 
Hence they titled themselves wang. 
67 Jun 君 (Your hignness) was a respectful form of address to call a monarch. Guaren 寡人 
(“I, a person who lacks virtue”) was a humble title used by a monarch to call himself. Qi was on 
the northeast of Chu. Ancient Chinese believed that the mainland is surrounded by four seas: the 
East Sea, the South Sea, the West Sea, and the North Sea. Here, the phrase is of course a hyperbo-
le used to describe the great distance between Qi and Chu. 
68 CZZZ 12.376–377: 君處北海，寡人處南海，唯是風馬牛不相及也。不虞君之涉吾地也，
何故？ 
69 King Zhao of Zhou (Zhou Zhao wang, r. 995–977 B.C.E.) was drowned when crossing the 
river of Hanshui 漢水 because his ship sank. It is said that his ship was deliberately built unstable. 
Here Guan Zhong indicated that Chu had something to do with it. 
70 CZZZ 12.378–379: 爾貢包茅不入，王祭不共，無以縮酒，寡人是徵。昭王南征而不復，
寡人是問。 
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people;”71 and “to eliminate the disorder.”72 However, as Mengzi 孟子 says, “during 
the Chunqiu, no righteous war occurred” (Chunqiu wu yizhan 春秋無義戰).73 Alt-
hough wars were often started in the name of yi 義 (“righteousness”), the real goals 
of wars were always about li and/or hai. For Qi, zun wang rang yi was just a cover. 
Qi’s purpose was to obtain li – consolidating and strengthening its hegemony – and 
to remove hai – suppressing its strongest challenger, Chu. Qi’s next move was not 
dependent on whether Chu was related to the death of King Zhao of Zhou or not but 
based on its own best interests. Guan Zhong’s reply was also a test of Chu’s attitude, 
which would be a key factor affecting Qi’s next move. The Chu envoy perceived 
the intention of Guan Zhong and replied: 
Not paying the tribute is the fault of our mornach who lacks virtue 寡君.74 How 
dare [we] not to pay it [in the future]? As to Zhao wang’s not returning, jun can 
ask about it along the banks of the river [of Hanshui].75 
The Chu envoy accepted the minor fault without excuses but flatly denied the major 
one. He indicated that Chu could make a concession but only a limited one. It 
seemed that Qi was not satisfied with Chu’s offer for peace. This initial negotiation 
did not achieve any result. The allies kept marching towards the south to bring mili-
tary pressure to bear upon Chu. However, the allies did not hastily launch offen-
sives but halted at Xing 陘 (a place of Chu). In the summer, King Cheng of Chu 
sent a high ranking Chu royal house member, Qu Wan 屈完, to further negotiate 
with Qi. This time, the attitude of Qi had obviously changed. The allies retreated 
back to Shaoling (a place of Chu) as a gesture of goodwill. It is not recorded what 
the allies had done when they were stationed at Xing. But from the change of Qi’s 
attitude, it is not hard to guess that they were collecting information and comparing 
different plans based on the collected intelligence. And finally, they denied the 
option of a total war with Chu, which was too risky and costly. At Shaoling, Lord 
Huan of Qi honored Qu Wan by inviting him to be on the same four-horse chariot 
with him to inspect the allied troops together. Lord Huan told Qu Wan that he was 
willing to establish a “friendly” relationship with Chu, as with its other allies. But 
he also made a show of force through the parade and threatened: 
Heading such [great] troops to fight in open battles, who can withstand? Heading 
such [great troops] to attack walled cities, which one cannot be taken?76 
It seems that Qi favored to minimize the matter after weighing the advantages and 
disadvantages during the period between the two negotiations. However, Lord Huan 
still wanted to test Chu’s bottom line before making his final decision. A meaning-
ful question was what kind of “friendly” relationship Qi wanted? Qi was the meng-
zhu 盟主 (“leader of the alliance”). All its allies were in a subordinate position and 
________________________ 
71 Yuan-kang Wang 2011, p. 27. See also Turner 1993, p. 296.  
72 Godehardt 2008, p. 25. 
73 Mengzi zhushu 14.448. 
74 Guajun (“our] monarch who lacks virtue”) was a humble title used by a subject to call 
his/her monarch in front of foreigners. 
75 CZZZ 12.379–380: 貢之不入，寡君之罪也，敢不共給。昭王之不復，君其問諸水濱。 
76 CZZZ 12.380: 以此眾戰，誰能禦之？以此攻城，何城不克？ 
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they had to take orders from Qi. As a great power, Chu definitely could not accept 
such a “friendly” relationship. Hence, Qu Wan replied: 
If Your highness stabilizes zhuhou by virtue, who dares not to obey you? If Your 
highness [chooses to conquer us] by force, Chu will use the Fangcheng 方城 as its 
wall,77 and Hanshui as its moat [to defend itself]. Although [Your highness’s] 
troops are so numerous, they will not be of any use.78 
Wang Qing 王青 connects Qu Wan’s reply with the moral view. Qu Wan believed 
that a state should make other states to follow it relying on virtue rather than on 
force.79 But if Qi did not threaten Chu by force, how could Chu agree to make a 
concession? Actually, the first sentence of Qu Wan’s reply represents just typical 
diplomatic language at that time. The two key points implied by Qu Wan are in the 
rest of the paragraph. On one hand, he clearly showed Chu’s determination to resist 
aggression, which would infringe on its sovereignty and territorial integrity. But on 
the other hand, he indicated that Chu’s strategy was defensive and Chu had no in-
tention to challenge Qi’s hegemony. Finally, Qi and Chu made a covenant. Chu 
namely recognized Zhou tianzi as the master of tianxia and Lord Huan of Qi as the 
leader of zhuhou, agreed to pay tribute and stopped to expand northward. In return, 
the allies retreated from Chu’s territory. 
The above case is a typical example of fajiao. The following points are worth of 
attention. First of all, fajiao was used when the adversary was too strong to be de-
feated. Cai’s military strength was negligible compared to Qi and its allies. There-
fore, Qi did not consider famou or fajiao at all but chose to adopt a direct military 
attack to crush Cai. However, Qi’s attitude towards Chu was much more cautious 
because Chu was a very powerful state. Although Qi was probably more powerful 
and had more allies, it had no decided advantage over Chu. If Qi chose to go to war, 
Chu would enjoy the advantage of fighting on its vast homeland. Hence, the result 
of war was unpredictable. Even if Qi eventually could defeat Chu, it would proba-
bly be a protracted and costly war, which Qi would not benefit from. A third state 
might seize the hegemony after both Qi and Chu were weakened by the war. Qi’s 
purpose was not to defeat Chu but to consolidate and strengthen its hegemony. If 
defeating Chu could not help Qi to achieve that goal, then it would be stupid to do 
so. Therefore, Qi wisely chose to subdue Chu by fajiao.  
Secondly, fajiao does not completely exclude using force. Hu Xiaotie argues that 
subjugating the enemy without fighting does not mean completely giving up the use 
of force. Sometimes, it is necessary to use “a little bit of force” (yidian bingli 一點
兵力).80 Hu significantly understates the importance of using military power. Un-
like common diplomacy, the purpose of fajiao is to subdue the enemies rather than 
develop friendly and co-operative relations with them. In order to subdue Chu, Qi 
mobilized massive forces. A certain level of violence may also be involved. For 
________________________ 
77 Fangcheng was a long wall (changcheng 長城) built by Chu to defend northern invanders. 
It was from the north of today’s Fangcheng 方城 to the northeast of today’s Miyang 泌阳 of 
Henan 河南 province. 
78 CZZZ 12.380–381: 君若以德綏諸侯，誰敢不服？君若以力，楚國方城以為城，漢水以
為池，雖眾，無所用之。   
79 Wang Qing 2016, p. 24.  
80 Hu Xiaotie 1994, p. 68. 
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instance, Qi crushed Chu’s ally, Cai, and might encounter pockets of resistance 
from Chu’s local troops after invading its territory. However, Qi had not engaged 
with the Chu main forces and did not rely on waging a decisive battle to achieve its 
goal. The level of violence must be moderate. If too light, Chu would not yield. If 
too excessive, a great war would be inevitable.  
Thirdly, one may not achieve all that one expected through fajiao because after 
all, diplomacy is the art of compromise. From the “alliance of Shaoling,” Qi only 
obtained its minimum goal. From the fact that until the last moment, Lord Huan 
was still threatening Chu, it can be seen that he probably wanted more from Chu. 
However, because Chu firmly held its bottom line, eventually he had to give up. 
Although Chu namely submitted to Zhou and Qi and agreed to symbolically pay 
tributes, it actually maintained its territorial integrity and independence, and re-
served its strength. But certainly Qi was the winner of the game. After the “alliance 
of Shaoling,” Chu dared not to openly challenge Qi, whose hegemony hen reached 
a peak.81 
The second case to be dealt with here is about famou. After the death of Lord 
Huan of Qi, Qi declined and then two other great powers, Jin and Chu started nearly 
a century of wars to contend for hegemony (633–546 B.C.E.). In the 20th year of 
King Xiang of Zhou (632 B.C.E.), Lord Wen of Jin defeated Chu at the battle of 
Chengpu and then confirmed its hegemony.82 However, afterwards Jin lost its ad-
vantage against Chu and suffered a great failure at the battle of Bi in the 10th year 
of King Ding of Zhou (597 B.C.E.). Although in the 11th year of King Jian of Zhou 
(575 B.C.E.), Jin again defeated Chu at the battle of Yanling, this victory did not 
have any decisive significance. In the reign of Lord Dao of Jin (Jin Dao gong 晉悼
公, r. 573–558 B.C.E.), the seemingly endless struggle continued to revolve around 
Zheng, a medium power of paramount geostrategic importance located in the heart-
land of tianxia (today’s central Henan province) between Jin and Chu. Being able to 
completely subdue Zheng would be of great importance in this fierce competition. 
Hence, both sides took turns to attack Zheng. Zheng was unable to resist either Jin 
or Chu so that it kept swinging between the two. When the Jin army arrived, it 
submitted to Jin and when the Chu army arrived, it submitted to Chu.  
In the 10th month of the 8th year of King Ling of Zhou (564 B.C.E.), Jin and its 
allies Song, Lu, Wei, Cao, Ju 莒, Zhu, Teng 滕, Xue 薛, Xiaozhu 小邾, and Qi 
attacked Zheng, which had submitted to Chu in late winter, and besieged its capital. 
Once more, Zheng gave up resistance and sued for peace. Jin shangjun jiang 上軍
將 (chief commander of the upper army)83 Zhonghang Xianzi 中行獻子84 was tired 
of Zheng’s capriciousness. Hence he suggested: 
________________________ 
81 Bai Shouyi 2004, p. 932. 
82 The official title of the Jin monarchs was Jin hou 晉侯. 
83  At that time, the Jin field army was divided into four armies, called zhongjun 中軍 , 
shangjun 上軍, xiajun 下軍, and xinjun 新軍 respectively. Each army again was divided into two 
units led by a jiang 將 and a zuo 佐 separately. The zhongjun jiang was specially called yuanshu-
ai 元帥 (“chief commander”). The ranks of the eight major commanders from high to low were 
zhongjun yuanshuai, zhongjun zuo, shangjun jiang, shangjun zuo, xiajun jiang, xiajun zuo, xinjun 
jiang, and xinjun zuo. In Jin, zhongjun yuanshuai was also zhengqing 正卿 (also known as 
shangqing 上卿), who ranked first among all qing (please refer to footnote 17) and was the chief 
minister and chief commander of a state (in the Chunqiu, a nobleman usually held a concurrent 
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Continue to besiege its capital, wait for the Chu noblemen to come to rescue it, 
and then fight with them. Otherwise, [Zheng] will not make a [true] peace treaty 
[with us].85 
Obviously, Zhonghang Xianzi thought that the only way to break the deadlock was 
to have a decisive battle with Chu. However, Jin zhengqing and zhongjun yuanshuai 
Zhi Wuzi 知武子 had a different plan. He said: 
[We should] allow Zheng to ally with us and withdraw our armies [so that we can 
attract the Chu noblemen to attack Zheng] so as to wear out them. I shall divide 
our four armies into three. [Each time they come], [we will wait until they have 
withdrawn and then use one–third of our troops] together with zhuhou’s crack 
troops (also divided into three) to attack. This will not tire our [troops] but Chu 
will not be able to endure. [This way] is better than engaging in battles.86 
The allies adopted Zhi Wuzi’s plan and made a covenant with Zheng. Chu’s re-
sponse was quick. In the 12th month, after the allies had retreated, Chu attacked and 
subdued Zheng. In autumn of the next year (the 9th year of King Ling of Zhou [563 
B.C.E.]), the allies attacked Zheng and subdued it in the 10th month. However, in 
the 11th month, Zheng again submitted to Chu after the Chu army had come. At 
that time, the allies had not left Zheng yet. Jin xiajun jiang Luan Huanzi 欒桓子 
wanted to attack the Zheng army to punish Zheng’s treachery but Zhi Wuzi did not 
permit it and ordered the troops to retreat. In the 4th month of the 10th year of King 
Ling of Zhou (562 B.C.E.), the allies attacked Zheng, and allied with it in the 7th 
month. In the same month, Chu allied with Qin 秦 to attack Zheng and subdued it. 
Before attacking Zheng, Chu asked the assistance of troops from Qin, which never 
happened before. This clearly showed that Chu had already been worn out. In the 
9th month, the allies once again attacked Zheng. This time, Chu finally gave up and 
did not take any action. Since then, Zheng was dead set on following Jin. Even the 
Chu noblemen themselves admitted that “currently Chu really was unable to con-
tend with [Jin]” (jin Chu shi bu jing 今楚實不競).87 Therefore, Jin successfully 
restored its hegemony, which is known as the “restoration of hegemony by Jin Dao 
[gong]” (Jin Dao fuba 晉悼複霸). Zuozhuan summarizes this as: “[Jin] called out 
its troops thrice and then Chu was unable to contend with [it].”88  
Swaine and Tellis believe that the Chinese states preferred to use noncoercive 
measures because they “were generally shown to be more effective and deemed less 
costly and less controversial domestically.”89 Ni Lexiong argues that the purpose of 
___________________ 
post of government officer and military chief). Zhongjun zuo was yaqing 亞卿 (also known as 
ciqing 次卿 or zhongqing 中卿) who ranked second among all qing; the other jiang and zuo were 
xiaqing 下卿. Together they were known as the “eight qing” (baqing 八卿), who formed the core 
ruling team of Jin. 
84 Zhonghang is his clan name; Xianzi is his posthumous name. 
85 CZZZ 30.1001: 遂圍之，以待楚人之救也，而與之戰。不然，無成。  
86 CZZZ 30.1001: 許之盟而還師，以敝楚人。吾三分四軍，與諸侯之銳，以逆來者，於
我未病，楚不能矣，猶愈於戰。  
87 CZZZ 32.1409. 
88 CZZZ, 30.1007: 三駕而楚不能與爭。 
89 Swaine – Tellis 2000, p. 66. 
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victory without fighting is to minimize the destruction of society.90 They all omit 
the simplest reason – being unable to defeat the enemy by doing battles. Zhi Wuzi 
was a senior and experienced commander, who had attended two of the three great-
est battles between Jin and Chu, the battles of Bi and Yanling. He was acutely 
aware of the fact that Jin and Chu were well-matched in strength. The reason that he 
rejected the suggestion of Zhonghang Xianzi and Luan Huanzi was very simple. He 
was uncertain about defeating the Chu army in the battlefield. Hence he said:  
If [we] fight with [Chu], but cannot defeat [it], [we] will be laughed at by zhuhou. 
Victory cannot be guaranteed. [We] had better withdraw.91  
Even if Jin could defeat Chu, the victory might not be decisive, as at the battle of 
Yanling, at which although one of the eyes of King Gong of Chu (Chu Gong wang 
楚共王, r. 590–560 B.C.E.) was hurt and the Chu army escaped at night, it was not 
crushed in the battlefield. Moreover, although Jin had many allies, they “all did not 
want to fight” (jie bu yu zhan 皆不欲戰).92 Jin’s allies followed Jin because they 
feared Jin’s powerful strength. But they did not want to serve as cannon fodder for 
the Jin–Chu contention. And some of Jin’s allies were not very reliable, especially 
Qi, the former hegemon which had declined but was still a great power. Once Jin’s 
power was weakened, Qi would seize the opportunity to get rid of the control of Jin 
and challenge it.93 Hence Zhi Wuzi avoided directly engaging with the Chu army 
but divided the Jin armies into three to wear out Chu. Therefore, Jin could beat Chu 
in the competition without losing its forces. If Jin chose to fight Chu in the battle-
field, even if it won, most likely it would pay a high price. In that case, the other 
states, like Qi, would take the advantage of it. Instead of becoming stronger, such a 
military victory might cause Jin to lose its hegemony. Compared to Zhonghang 
Xianzi and Luan Huanzi, Zhi Wuzi looked at the problem more sensibly and com-
prehensively. 
An interesting question is why Chu did not use the same strategy against Jin (di-
viding the Chu army into three and taking turns to attack). In order to carry out such 
a plan, close cooperation within the state and army is absolutely necessary. Half a 
century later, in the 8th year of King Jing of Zhou (512 B.C.E.), Wu Zixu 伍子胥, a 
Chu nobleman who escaped to Wu, suggested to King Helü of Wu (Wu wang Helü 
吳王闔閭, r. 514–496 B.C.E.) the same strategy to wear out Chu. He believed that 
this strategy would work by giving the following reason: 
Chu had many [noblemen] in power but [they are] at odds [with each other]. 
[Hence] nobody will take the responsibility for any calamity. If [we] divide [our] 
army into three to harass [Chu in turn], when one of them invades [Chu], all the 
Chu forces will come [to meet our troops].94 
________________________ 
90 Ni Lexiong 2001, p. 161. 
91 CZZZ 30.1022: 戰而不克，為諸侯笑。克不可命，不如還也。 
92 CZZZ 30.1002. 
93 Qi was reluctant to accept Jin as mengzhu and always tried to betray Jin whenever the op-
portunity arose. For instance, in the 18th year of King Ding of Zhou (589 B.C.E.), Qi associated 
with Jin’s enemy Chu and then attacked Jin’s ally Lu in the next year (CZZZ 25.788). In the 14th 
year of King Ling of Zhou (558 B.C.E.), Qi again betrayed Jin and attacked its ally Lu (CZZZ 
32.1073). 
94 CZZZ 53.1747: 楚執政眾而乖，莫適任患。若為三師以肄焉，一師至，彼必皆出。  
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The internal contradictions of the Chu ruling class were very fierce. Many Chu 
noblemen, like Wu Zixu, were forced to flee their homeland. And they finally chose 
to serve Chu’s enemies, such as Jin and Wu.95 Therefore, Chu could not use the 
same strategy to strike back against Jin. On the contrary, the Jin noblemen were 
united at that time. Zuozhuan says that “the eight qing [of Jin] have a harmonious 
relationship” (ba qing hemu 八卿和睦).96 Moreover, Zhi Wuzi had great authority 
to make his colleagues with different opinions to follow him. Hence his plan could 
be carried out. Sunzi says that “one who knows his adversary and himself will not 
be in danger in a hundred battles” (zhi bi zhi ji zhe, baizhan budai 知彼知己者，百
戰不殆).97 If one wants to win through famou, one must know the adversary and 
oneself too. Zhi Wuzi perceived the weakness of Chu and formulated a strategy to 
cope with it. He succeeded because he knew his adversary and himself. Many 
scholars agree that famou refers to the idea of psychological warfare.98 I think that 
psychological warfare can be part of famou but the concept of famou is not just 
limited to psychological warfare. For example, in the above case, Jin took substan-
tively military actions to wear out Chu. Hence, any stratagem utilizing the enemy’s 
weakness can be regarded as famou.  
From the above case, it can be seen that famou has much in common with fajiao. 
It may include using military force but does not rely on waging decisive battles to 
achieve its goals. However, unlike fajiao, famou does not rely on diplomatic means 
to solve the conflict and no official agreement is reached between the two sides. By 
comparing the two cases, it can be seen that Qi only obtained its minimum goal 
through fajiao, but Jin achieved its full goal, completely subduing Zheng through 
famou. It seems that famou is more effective than fajiao. Why is that? I will discuss 
the reason later. 
In the above two cases, Qi and Jin were at least not weaker than their adversary, 
or even a bit stronger. Bu zhan er qu ren zhi bing was used as an offensive strategy 
in these cases. Then let us look at two other examples, in which bu zhan er qu ren 
zhi bing was applied as a defensive strategy against much stronger enemies. During 
the Chunqiu, Zheng was a popular target for great powers because of its important 
geographical location. In the 9th month of the 22nd year of King Xiang of Zhou 
(630 B.C.E.), Zheng was besieged by allied forces of two great powers, Jin and Qin. 
Zheng was unable to resist such powerful enemies through military means so that it 
chose to protect itself by fajiao. Zheng dafu 大夫 Zhu Zhiwu 燭之武 went to see 
Lord Mu of Qin99 secretly at night and said to him: 
If exterminating Zheng benefits Your highness, [our broken state] dares to bother 
[Your highness’] ministers [to do so]. [But] Your highness know the difficulty of 
having a remote [place] as [ Your highness’] border city when there are other 
________________________ 
95 For example, the Guo yu 國語 (Discourse of the states) summarizes the most significant de-
fection events of Chu from the reign of King Cheng of Chu to the reign of King Gong of Chu. See 
Guo yu jijie, 17. 489–492. 
96 CZZZ 30.983. 
97 Sunzi 1.42. 
98 Li Ling 2006, p. 120, Mott – Kim 2006, p. 12, Godehardt 2008, p. 10, and Kang Jingbiao 
2015, p. 2. 
99 The official title of the Qin monarchs was Qin bo 秦伯. 
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states between [the mainland of Your highness’ state and it].100  [Hence] why 
should [Your highness] exterminate Zheng to benefit [ Your highness’] neigh-
bor?101 The greater [Your highness’] neighbor becomes, the weaker Your high-
ness’ [state] is. If [Your highness] absolves Zheng and lets [Zheng] to be [Your 
highness’] host on the way to the east to provide necessities to [Your highness’] 
messengers, this will be of no harm to Your highness. Moreover, Your highness’ 
had benefited the [former] Jin monarch.102 [He] promised [to give] Your highness’ 
the cities of Jiao 焦 and Xia 瑕. [But he] crossed [the Huanghe river] in the morn-
ing and then built city walls [to defend Your highness’] in the evening.103 This is 
what Your highness’ know. Jin, how can it be ever satisfied? After having made 
Zheng its east boundary, [Jin] will expand its border on the west. Where will it get 
[land] if not by cutting down Qin’s? [To exterminate Zheng will] diminish Qin 
but benefit Jin. Your highness’, please consider it.104 
Lord Mu of Qin was persuaded by Zhu Zhiwu. Hence he allied with Zheng, left 
three dafu of Qin to help Zheng guard its capital, and returned to Qin. In order to 
avoid a direct conflict with Qin, the Jin army also retreated. Zheng successfully 
survived this great crisis through fajiao.  
Zhu Zhiwu persuaded Lord Mu by clearly stating the li of retaining Zheng and 
the hai of exterminating it. However, the eloquence of Zhu Zhiwu was not the only 
reason for his success. A more important reason was his acute perception. He per-
ceived the hidden contradiction of the seemingly unbreakable Jin–Qin alliance.105 
After the battle of Chengpu, Lord Wen of Jin became the second hegemon of the 
Chunqiu after Lord Huan of Qi. However, Lord Mu of Qin was also an ambitious 
monarch who was seeking hegemony. He was not reconciled to let Jin dominate 
tianxia exclusively. Zhu Zhiwu brilliantly utilized Lord Mu’s ambition to break up 
the Jin–Qin alliance and saved his state without fighting. 
However, it is worthwhile to note that usually fajiao is not free from a price. The 
eloquence of Zhu Zhiwu was not sufficient to let Qin agree to ally with Zheng. The 
price was that Zheng had to allow the Qin troops to stay at its capital and to provide 
supplies to them,106 which implied a hidden danger for the future. The mission of 
the three dafu of Qin left in Zheng was not just to help it defend Jin. They were also 
spies and contacts inside Zheng who were going to help Qin to annex Zheng, as the 
next case shows.  
In the winter of the 24th year of King Xiang of Zhou (628 B.C.E.), Qi Zi 杞子, 
one of the three dafu of Qin left in Zheng informed Qin that it was the time to take 
________________________ 
100 Qin and Zheng were not bounded but separated by Jin, Zhou, and Hua 滑.  
101 Here he indicated that because it was difficult for Qin to occupy Zheng, Qin’s neighbor Jin 
would gain the territory of Zheng after Zheng’s fall. 
102 Lord Mu of Qin had helped Lord Hui of Jin (Jin Hui gong 晉惠公, r. 659–621 B.C.E.) to 
go back to Jin to succeed to the position of Jin hou.  
103 Jin was on the right side of Huanghe and Qin was on the left. 




105 Lord Wen of Jin was the brother-in-law and son-in-law of Lord Mu of Qin. Having the full 
support of Qin, Lord Wen seized power from his paternal nephew Lord Huai of Jin (Jin Huai 
gong 晉懷公, r. 637 B.C.E.).  
106 CZZZ 17.545–546. 
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Zheng because he was holding the key of the north gate of its capital. Hence the Qin 
army departed from its homeland to attack Zheng and then in the next spring, ar-
rived at Hua, a small state close to Zheng. Xian Gao 弦高, a merchant of Zheng, 
happened to meet the Qin army on the way. He pretended to be the envoy of Zheng 
to refresh and reward the Qin army with four dressed hides, preceding twelve head 
of cattle and said to the Qin commanders: 
Dear gentlemen, our mornach who lacks virtue heard that you will march with 
your army to pass through our broken state.107 [Our mornach] presumes to refresh 
and reward [your] attendants. [Although] our broken state is not rich, [we have 
prepared] for a long-time stay of them. [For every day they stay here, we] will 
prepare one day’s provisions for [them]. [For every day they march within our ter-
ritory, we] will prepare one night’s guarding for [them].108 
The Qin commanders thought that Zheng had already known of Qin’s plan of attack 
and were well-prepared for it. Therefore, they gave up attacking it and retreated. 
Once more, Zheng made a stronger enemy pull back without fighting.  
The same as in the first example of famou, zhi bi zhi ji was a key factor for 
Zheng’s success. Qin’s capital Yong 雍 (in today’s Fengxiang 鳳翔 of Shaanxi 陝
西 province) and Zheng’s capital Xinzheng 新鄭 (in today’s Xinzheng of Henan 
province) were about 581 kilometers apart (straight-line distance) and Qin had to 
cross the territories of Jin, Zhou, and Hua to attack Zheng. If Qin could not win the 
war quickly, its supplies would be a big issue. Behind the politely diplomatic lan-
guage, Xian Gao actually passed a serious warning to the Qin commanders. The 
wording “[we are prepared] for a long-time stay of them” means that Zheng had 
prepared for a siege of a long time. The wording “[for everyday they stay here, we] 
will prepare one day’s provisions for [them]” means that Zheng had sufficient re-
serves. Giving twelve head of cattle to the Qin army was a proof of it. The wording 
“[for every day they march within our territory, we] will prepare one night’s guard-
ing for [them]” means that Zheng had sufficient manpower. Xian Gao’s warning 
was not just a bluff. After all, Zheng was not a weak state but a medium power. It 
was probably unable to defeat the Qin army in an open battle but most likely could 
defend its walled capital for a relatively long time. During the Chunqiu, it was not 
easy to take a walled city if the defenders were well prepared and had a strong will 
to resist. For instance, in the 9th month of the 12th year of King Ding of Zhou (595 
B.C.E.), Chu besieged Song, a medium power like Zheng, but could not make it 
yield until the 5th month of the next year.109 Therefore, Sunzi suggests that one 
should try to avoid gongcheng. Without the advantage of a surprise attack and the 
help of contacts inside, the Qin army was unsure about taking Zheng in a short time 
so that it had to give up its original plan. In this case, Zheng did not actually use its 
forces but its military strength did play an important role in deterring the enemy. 
Someone may argue that the above case should be considered as an example of 
fajiao. However, Xian Gao was actually not an envoy of Zheng. Moreover, Zheng 
________________________ 
107 Biyi 敝邑 (our broken state) was a humble form of address for one to call one’s state. 
108 CZZZ 17.545: 寡君聞吾子將步師出於敝邑，敢犒從者，不腆敝邑，為從者之淹，居
則具一日之積，行則備一夕之衛。 
109 CZZZ 24.759, 763 
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and Qin did not come to any official agreement. Therefore, I argue that it is an ex-
ample of famou. 
From the above two cases, the following two points are to worthy of attention. 
First of all, when famou and fajiao were applied as a defensive strategy, fighting 
could be completely avoided. But strictly speaking, Zheng did not subjugate its 
enemies. As I have discussed before, in these cases, the character qu 屈 is more 
appropriate to be interpreted as “frustrating [the enemy’s strategic goals].” It is 
naive to believe that one can defeat overwhelming enemy forces solely relying on 
stratagems and tricks unless the enemies make fatal mistakes and expose fatal 
weaknesses. Secondly, once again famou performed more effectively than fajiao. 
Xian Gao made the powerful Qin army retreat at the price of just four dressed hides 
and twelve head of cattle. It is because diplomacy is the art of compromise and 
involves the exchange of interests. For example, Qi had to give up part of its de-
mands in order to avoid crossing the bottom line of Chu. Zheng had to satisfy Qin’s 
requirements in order to ally with it. Therefore, usually the cost of fajiao is higher 
than famou. I think this is why Sunzi prefers famou to fajiao. However, in order to 
subdue the enemy or frustrate the enemy’s plan through famou, a prerequisite is that 
the enemy must have made mistakes and exposed weaknesses first. Otherwise, 
famou will not work. This is why Sunzi says that “the enemy’s vincibility depends 
on itself” (ke sheng zai di 可勝在敵).110 The table below summarizes the key fea-
tures and differences between famou and fajiao. 
 
TABLE 1: COMPARISON BETWEEN FAMOU AND FAJIAO 
 famou fajiao 
Practicability Can be used as both offensive and 
defensive strategy, especially when 
one does not have overwhelming 
advantages over his adversary 
Can be used as both offensive and 
defensive strategy, especially when 
one does not have overwhelming 
advantages over his adversary 
Use of vio-
lence  
May involve a certain level of vio-
lence but does not rely on doing 
decisive battles to achieve one’s goals 
Violence may be completely avoided 
if it is used as a defensive strategy 
May involve a certain level of vio-
lence but does not rely on doing 
decisive battles to achieve one’s goals 
Violence may be completely avoided 
if it is used as a defensive strategy 
Effectiveness  Relatively high Relatively low 
More likely to require a compromise 
Cost Relatively low Relatively high, especially when it is 
used as a defensive strategy 
Conditions for 
success 
More relying on the weaknesses 
exposed by the enemy and one’s 
ability to find them 
More relying on the willingness of 
both sides to compromise 
Official 
agreement  
An official agreement between the 
two parties is unnecessary. 
An official agreement is made be-
tween the two parties. 
________________________ 
110 Sunzi 1.43. 
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CONCLUSION  
In summary, the idea of bu zhan er qu ren zhi bing is neither purely peaceful nor 
defensive. It does not mean subjugating the enemy without fighting but means to 
avoid fighting “fair” open battles with the enemy. I argue that it is more appropriate 
to translate the famous quote of Sunzi as “To fight and win a hundred open battles is 
not the most brilliant [method] among all brilliant [methods]; to subdue the enemy 
army or frustrate its strategic goals without doing open battles is the most brilliant 
[method] among all brilliant [methods].” When the enemy is too strong to be easily 
defeated, famou (to strike [the enemy] through stratagems) and fajiao (to strike [the 
enemy] through diplomacy) are probably better options than fabing (directly engag-
ing with the enemy army in the field) and gongcheng (attacking [strongly fortified] 
walled cities). Famou and fajiao do not rule out using forces and taking military 
actions, but they do not rely on defeating the enemies in decisive battles to achieve 
one’s goals. By studying the history of the Chunqiu, it can be seen that famou and 
fajiao can be used as both offensive and defensive strategies. If it is used as an of-
fensive strategy, a certain level of violence (not including engagement with the 
enemy main forces) is usually inevitable. But if it is used as a defensive strategy, 
violence means may be completely avoided. By applying famou and fajiao, great 
powers like Qi and Jin won in the contention for hegemony, and Zheng, a relatively 
weaker state survived the fierce competition. Therefore, I argue that bu zhan er qu 
ren zhi bing is not an idealistic concept but a realistic strategy developed from an 
era of wars to adapt to a much more competitive and complicated environment. At 
least during the period of the Chunqiu, it was practically applied by states to cope 
with their enemies. Generally, famou is more effective than fajiao because the latter 
usually requires compromise and/or paying a relatively higher price. But in order to 
apply famou, one must be able to find the weakness of one’s enemy and know how 
to utilize it. 
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